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I. Introduction 
The Brazilian Unified Health System (SUS) is a new decentralized structure for managing public 
health care. The new system transferred responsibilities and resources from the  central 
government to the states as well as the municipalities. On the one hand, this process enhanced 
the quality of health services, increased the participation of the population, resulting in a more 
transparent decision making process, and adapted the s upply of services to local health 
conditions. On the other hand, decentralization also brought inefficiencies due to the loss of 
economies of scale and scope, the fragmentation of services and the coordination failures. 
Therefore, one of the main challenges faced by the new system appears to be the trade-off 
between decentralization and coordination.  
The process of assigning responsibilities among different levels of government is well 
understood by the fiscal federalism literature, which includes the devolution of autonomy 
principle (Oates, 1999; Wagner, 1983). This principle establishes that public goods and services 
shall be provided by the level of government which more closely represents the beneficiaries: 
Decentralized decision making can increase social welfare by adjusting provision of goods and 
services to different preferences and local costs. 
On the opposite side, supplying certain services by small municipalities can bring 
considerable diseconomies of scale. New technologies in the medical sciences increase the 
system complexity and costs so that disseminating supply among all municipalities, with its 
resulting atomization, generates inefficiencies. This happens because the production of 
specialized health services frequently requires scales of production which are not compatible 
with the small local population demand. Indeed, only a much reduced number of municipalities 3 
 
in Brazil have a population big enough to justify the supply of all levels of complexity required 
by an integral health care system.  
In addition to the scale problem, it should also be stressed that different municipalities 
have also different levels of technical capability. Moreover the organization of functional health 
systems is not necessarily restricted to municipal territories. Thus, in addition to geographical 
issues, one should also consider network issues as well as technical and operational capabilities 
in order to properly define the functioning of decentralized health systems. 
Therefore, the issues of articulation and integration of municipal systems come to play an 
important role if one wants to ensure access to health services of desired complexity levels. The 
consequent association of several municipalities in order to jointly offer public services seems to 
be an old and wide-spread procedure throughout the world. In Spain, local partnerships can be 
traced back to the year 1409, when the Mancomunidad de Enirio-Aralar, at the Basque country, 
joined 13 municipalities for handling forest resources. Presently, 5857 out of 8096 Spanish 
municipalities are associated into “mancomunidades” (Fonte, Suarez and Parrado-Diez, 1999). In 
the United States, Community Health Partnership (CHP) initiatives flourished as a result of 
voluntary collaborations of public and private actors. According to Mitchell and Shortell (2002), 
there is evidence that the CHP “frequently fail to achieve measurable results” and problems 
associated to their governance and management have been sited as the possible causes of that 
failure.  In Finland, the decentralized health care system, formed by 450 autonomous 
municipalities responsible for most services, was partially integrated into large municipal 
associations–the so called Health Care Districts-and its output indicators compete well in 
international comparisons (Niskanen, 2002). 4 
 
Collaboration and partnerships among municipalities also appeared in Brazil in the form 
of voluntary intermunicipal integration into health consortia (Mendes, 2001). There exist today 
more than 141 Intermunicipal Health Consortia (IHC) in Brazil, distributed among 13 states and 
providing services to more than 25 million people (Lima & Pastrana, 2000). Those institutions 
have been created since the 80’s, without clear definition about a regional organization in which 
they should be merged nor a clear public incentive for their constitution.  
It is worth noting that collective action at the local level aimed to address common issues 
is not restricted to the health care sector. It can also be found in areas such as education 
(typically  high schools), environment, sanitation and food supply, to mention just a few. 
Therefore, this article’s results can be easily adapted to analyze broader partnership phenomena. 
A consortium is a union of two or more organizations of the same legal status, as a tool 
for overcoming local challenges. The present article assumes that consortia enhance the 
efficiency and quality of services and, as a result, should be stimulated. 
Despite the efficiency gains derived from the consortium, there may be cases in which a 
municipality would opt to withdraw from the partnership, even when such a decision contravenes 
the contractual terms of the consortium, due to political or financial fragilities within the 
municipality.  
On the financial side, although municipalities were the primary beneficiaries of the 1988 
Constitution, which increases revenue appropriations to local governments, they continue to face 
a vulnerable fiscal situation. Although, on the one hand, their sources of financing have 
expanded, on the other hand, the decentralization of government services, especially social 5 
 
services, had a profound fiscal impact on local finance. That late development could reduce a 
municipal mayor’s incentive to honor her commitments to the consortium. 
On the political side, if a mayor believes that the municipality could continue to partially 
use the services and benefits derived from the consortium without the municipality’s financial 
participation (the free rider behavior), she may decide to become delinquent. This article posits 
that the principal objective of political leaders (the mayors) is to ensure her electoral survival. 
Therefore, she will take decisions in order to maximize the median voter’s utility. Furthermore, 
the median voter’s preference regarding investment in health - as opposed to other investments - 
will depend on a (stochastic) economic environment: in a favorable  environment the median 
voter may support strong investment in health programs whereas in an unfavorable situation the 
voter may prefer other more urgent types of spending, such as unemployment insurance, for 
example. 
 The financial and political considerations set out above clearly demonstrate the 
vulnerability of the consortia. When a municipality joins the consortium and subsequently 
defaults, the remaining members may take two different actions: they may suspend access to the 
consortium’s health services for the inhabitants of that municipality, or they may continue 
providing those services. Under the first scenario, the defaulting municipality has been punished. 
The purpose of the present study is to assess whether or not the existence of a punishment 
mechanism affects the outcome of this intricate political game as regards creation and 
sustainability of consortia.  
For that purpose, the present study analyses two game theoretic models. The first model 
assumes that it is possible to block health services to the inhabitants of a defaulting municipality. 6 
 
The equilibrium outcome shows that, in general, this is an efficient mechanism for preventing 
default. Therefore, under a punishment mechanism the consortium is stable. Some consortia, 
such as the  Consórcio Intermunicipal de Saúde de Penápolis/SP (CISA), have adopted that 
course of action (Ribeiro & Costa, 1999, Gontijo et all, 1994).  
Such approach, however, contravenes the SUS principle of universal service access with 
no barriers to citizens, a principle prescribed, moreover, in paragraph 196 of the Brazilian 
Federal Constitution. The second model assumes that blocking health services to citizens living 
is a defaulting municipality is not legally unfeasible. In this case, the equilibrium outcome shows 
that, if the consortium is formed, one municipality will default. In this case, the production of 
health services will be suboptimal. Moreover, if the gains from forming a consortium are not 
high enough, then the consortium will not be formed at all in the first place. This last result 
illustrates how an incentive problem coupled with an inappropriate legal system may lead to an 
inefficient equilibrium. 
The article is organized as follows. Section II sets out the basic model with a 
comprehensive explanation of the game. Section III discusses the equilibrium outcome of the 
game in the cases where a punishment mechanism is applied to the municipality that withdraws 
from the consortium. Section IV presents the solution of the game for those cases in which no 
punishment is imposed on the defaulting municipality. Section V extends the original model to 
include an analysis of what happens when the electorate’s preference for alternative (other than 
health) actions becomes predominant within the context of an unfavorable economic 
environment. Section VI offers other extensions to the basic model. Section VII discusses 7 
 




II. The basic model 
II.1. Description of the game 
In order to analyze the incentives for creation sustainability of Intermunicipal Health Consortia, 
we consider a two-periods (t=1,2), two-player dynamic game of incomplete information between 
the mayors of two municipalities j=1,2. 
In each period, mayor j, j=1,2, has a budget  Bj to be allocated between two types of 
expenditure: those involving health actions (S) and those including all other actions (P). Health 
actions can be implemented by each municipality separately - the so-called local health actions 
- and/or within partnership with other municipalities, through the constitution of a consortium1. 
For simplicity, assume that the both municipalities have the same budget:  B1=B2=B. This 
assumption can be easily relaxed as long as the budgets are not too different. 
The strategic decisions involving the agents are the following.  
In the first period, mayors decide whether to form or not to form an IHC.  
If they decide not to form a consortium, the expenditures of each municipality will be 
executed locally in each of the two periods. In this case, there will be no interaction between 
their populations or intermunicipal externalities. Therefore, each mayor  j=1,2 decides 
independently how to spend his budget in local health actions and other (local) actions in each of 
                                                                  
1 Typically, the consortium does not implement all health actions and services necessary in order to reduce health 
risks and aggravations. Therefore, even with the creation of the health partnerships, in general, local actions will 
continue to exist.  8 
 
the periods, t=1,2. Let Ljt denote the amount spent by municipality j in local health services at 
period t and let Pjt denote the amount spent by municipality j in other local actions at period t, 
where j=1,2 and  t=1,2. Note that when consortium is not formed mayors face the following 
budget constraint: 2 , 1 , 2 , 1 , = = £ + t j B P L jt jt . 
If the mayors decide to form the IHC, each municipality will be required to transfer a 
fixed monetary  amount  Sa,  which corresponds to an entry-fee that is used for the initial 
investments in the consortium. The investment Sa needs maturation so that its return takes place 
only at t=2. After the resource  is transferred to the consortium, each mayor j decides how to 
spend his remaining budget (B-Sa) in local health actions (Lj1) and other actions (Pj1) at time t=1. 
Note that when the IHC formed,  mayors face the following budget constraint  in period 1 :  
2 , 1 , 1 1 = - £ + j S B P L a j j . 
In the second period,  mayors decide whether they will remain in the consortium or 
abandon the institution. If they remain, they can benefit from the gains of the period 1’s initial 
investment kSa, k>1. The parameter k>1 reflects the part of the additional gains from forming a 
consortium. Moreover, they have to transfer a fixed amount Sq, which will be used to pay for the 
consortium’s  maintenance expenses. After the resource is transferred to the consortium, each 
mayor j decides how to spend his remaining budget (B-Sq) in local health actions (Lj2) and other 
actions (Pj2) at time t=2.  Note that when there is no default, mayors face the following budget 
constraint in period 2:  2 , 1 , 2 2 = - £ + j S B P L q j j . The quotas yield higher returns when spent 
under the IHC structure, resulting in lSq, l>1 for each municipality. This is the other part of the 
additional gains due to the joint provision of health service.  9 
 
The parameters k>1 and l>1 reflect the technological return of the IHC and models the 
fact that provision of health care services by the consortium generates a series of gains arising 
from economies of scale, implementation of a referral system, expansion and diversification of 
specialized service offerings, standardization of medical procedures, and availability of monetary 
incentives that stimulate an increase in productivity among health care professionals.  The 
difference between the gains that stem from the initial investment and the maintenance 
expenditures is due to the fact that each one of these expenditures fulfills different purposes. The 
initial expenditures are typically expenditures on capital goods, as construction or renovation of 
facilities, acquisition of equipments, and others. On the other hand, the expenditures in the 
second period will cover the maintenance costs of the consortium like salaries, supplies, etc.  
When municipality j defaults, not paying the maintenance quota Sq, mayor j decides how 
to spend his entire budget (B) in local health actions (Lj2) and other actions (Pj2) at time t=2.  
Note that when mayor j defaults, its budget constraint in period 2 is:  B P L j j £ + 2 2 . Moreover, in 
this case, the technological gains due to the other municipality’s investment will be reduced to  
(l/2)Sq. 
The goal of the present modeling is to assess the role of incentives in the decision of a 
mayor with respect to abandoning the consortium after its constitution and the effect of those 
incentives in the creation of that institution. For simplicity, the analysis is concentrated in one of 
the two players, the mayor j=2, assuming that the mayor j=1 will never abandon the consortium 
in the second period. 
There are two arguments for that simplification, one technical and the other one 
empirical. From a technical point of view, it simplifies the description and the resolution of the 10 
 
game and, at the same time, makes the partnership more attractive and secure to the other mayor. 
Therefore, under this hypothesis, if one obtains negative results about the sustainability of the 
partnership, these results will be even more significant. From an empiric point of view, the 
asymmetry between the two municipalities reflects the fact that one of them is considered the 
hosting municipality. Therefore, all the initial investment is done in that municipality, which will 
preserve the physical structure of the consortium if the other municipality decides to abandon it. 
In practice, everything occurs as if the hosting municipality does not have the option of 
abandoning the consortium. Section VI.3 describes the effects of relaxing that hypothesis on the 
game equilibria. 
After mayor j=2 decides whether or not to remain in the consortium, each player j=1,2 
decides how to spend its remaining budget (net of possible expenditures with the consortium) 
between local health action and others: Lj2 (health), Pj2 (others). 
Finally, the mayors derive utility from the investment decisions in the two periods, as 
described in the next section.  
 
II.2. The utility of Politicians 
The underlying assumption of the present study is that the primary motivation of every politician 
is to remain in power (Ferejohn (1986), Persson and Tabellini (2000), Bugarin (2003)). 
Therefore, the mayor will channel budget resources to expenditures that maximize his reelection 
probability.  
The impact of the mayor’s expenditure choices on her reelection prospects will depend on 
the value voters attach to investments on health actions compared to investments on other 11 
 
actions. This article assumes that the preferences of voters in municipality 2 in period t=1,2 can 
be described by the following Cobb-Douglas function:  
U2t (S2t , P2t , a ) = S2t
a P 2t 
(1 – a) 
The parameter a˛[0,1] in the equation above, which is discussed in greater detail in 
section II.5, can change from one period to the other revealing the extent to which the economic 
environment affects preference of voters of a municipality. Observe that the term S2t refers to the 
total investment in health actions, which involves the local health expenditures L2t as well as the 
expenditures in the consortium, Sa and Sq. 
As discussed before, for simplicity reasons we assume that voters of municipality 1 are 
interested exclusively in investments in health care actions. In addition to simplify the analysis, 
this hypothesis has the advantage of increasing the incentive to the formation of the consortium 
because of the technological gains discussed previously. Therefore, the instability results that 
will be shown in this article become even stronger in the case where municipality 1 can also 
spend resources on other actions
2. On the basis of this assumption, it is possible to express the 
preferences of these voters, in each period t=1,2, through the linear utility presented below:  
U1t(S1t)=S1t 
In the above equation, the term S1t refers to total health expenditure, involving local 
expenditure L1t as well as consortium expenditure Sa and Sq. Note that, when the consortium is 
not formed, mayor 1’s budget constraint at period t becomes simply  2 , 1 , 1 = £ t B L t . Similarly, 
                                                                  
2 Section VI presents a discussion about the results obtained when this hypothesis is relaxed. 12 
 
when the consortium is formed, mayor 1’s budget constraint is  a S B L - £ 11  in period 1 and 
q S B L - £ 12  in period 2. 
Finally, politician j=1,2 maximizes her reelection probability by also maximizing the sum 
Uj1+Uj2 of utilities in the two periods. Note that no discount factor is used. Section VI.5 presents 
a discussion on the effects of such a discounting. 
 
II.3. The states of Nature 
This paper’s models incorporate uncertainty about the economic environment. The relative 
importance voters attach to health care actions in relation to other actions is modeled by the 
parameter  a in the objective function of municipality 2. The parameter is contingent on a 
favorable (a = f) or unfavorable (a = d) economic environment, where f, d ˛ [0,1] and f > d. A 
favorable environment may indicate, for example, a period in which the general population’s 
financial conditions improve, a circumstance that enables that population to direct its aspirations 
toward medium and long-term government actions, which usually generate greater social returns 
(under the model, these are restricted to actions in the area of health care). By contrast, when the 
economic environment is unfavorable, voters tend to adopt a short-term view, to the extent that 
they turn their attention to actions that will bring them immediate benefits, like employment 
insurance during an economic crisis, for example.  
A value of at is realized at each period t=1,2 and observed by the mayor of municipality 
2 at the moment she makes a decision in the correspondent period. For simplicity, we assume 
that, in the first period, a1 = f. This hypothesis makes the consortium more attractive during this 
period, which reinforces the negative results of this article. 13 
 
II.4. The extensive form game 
As we consider a dynamic game of two periods, we will present an extensive form for the game 
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Figure 1: The extensive form representation of the game in period 1 
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Figure 1 presents the game in t=1. It begins in node t11 where municipality 1 decides 
whether or not to propose to municipality 2 to form a consortium. If the proposal is made, 
municipality 2 decides whether it will accept it (node t12). If 1 does not make a proposal or if 2 
does not accept it, the consortium is not formed and the players decide in isolation how much to 
invest on health and other actions (nodes t13, t14, t16, t17). Finally, if 2 accepts the proposal made 
by 1, the consortium is formed, the mayors pay the initial investments (Sa) and decide how to 
spend locally the rest of their resources (nodes t15 and t18). The dotted curves indicate that 
municipalities have an infinite number of possible actions in the corresponding decision node but 
only one generic choice is presented. In node t13, for example, mayor 1 can choose any value for 
L11 between 0 and B. 
Figure 2 represents the game in t=2, when the consortium is not formed in the first 
period. In that case, each municipality decides locally and independently how to invest the entire 
budget B in health care actions and other actions. In this article, uncertainty with respect to the 
economic environment is formalized by the introduction of a third player: nature (N), as it is 
usually done in game theory. The probability of a favorable state of nature (f) in the second 
period is r, while the probability of it being unfavorable (d) is (1–r). Player 2 observes the state 
of nature before making her investment decision in the second period. Due to the fact that the 
state of nature only affects the preferences of voters at municipality 2, this information is 
irrelevant to player 1. For that reason, player 1’s decision-node comes before Nature’s. Finally, 
observe that we model player 1’s decision as preceding player 2’s decision (nodes t14 to t18). To 
the extent that the decision of 1 about local expenditure does not affect player 2, there is no loss 
of generality in this modeling approach, which is made merely for the sake of simplifying the 15 
 
solution of the game. The same sequential approach is taken, again without loss of generality, in 













Figure 3 presents the continuation of the game when an IHC is formed in t=1. In that case 
the mayor of municipality 2 decides whether she honors its commitment with the partnership 
(node t32) - paying the quota Sq - or default, after observing the state of nature (node t31), that is, 
after verifying the relative preference of the voters between health care actions and other actions 
(a). In order to simplify the extensive form game, only one edge from the initial node was 
included, labeled a, which represents the two possible choices of the state of nature: a=f, d. The 
probability of the occurrence of these events is described generically by  pa=r  if  a=f and  
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Figure 2: The Game in the second period without consortium creation 
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pa=1-r, if a=d. Once that decision is taken, each municipality decides independently how to 
















The extensive form presented above applies to the two models that will be studied in this 
article depending on the parameter d, which can assume the values 0 and 1. When d=0 one has 
model 1, in which case default yields discontinuation of services to the inhabitants of the 
defaulting municipality. In that case municipality 2 will not benefit from the technological return 
associated to the consortium. In contrast, model 2 corresponds to the situation in which d=1. In 
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Figure 3: The Game in the second period with the consortium creation  
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that case, residents of the defaulting municipality can still have access to the consortium 
facilities. Nevertheless, due to the fact that only one municipality contributes to maintaining the 
consortium, the volume of available resources decreases, which reduces the technological return 
of the institution. 
In this article, a reduction in the technological factor from  l to l/2 models the effect of 
withdrawing from the consortium. Observe that if l<2, then resources invested in the consortium 
by municipality 1 in t=2 will generate less return than if the resources were invested locally. This 
phenomenon is due to the fact that the consortium serves a greater population – consisting of the 
residents of both municipalities – than local health facilities do. Furthermore, observe that the 
technological gain associated with the initial investment will not be modified. Indeed, it consists 
of an investment that was earlier executed. 
 
III. Model 1: The punishment case 
The first model assumes that punishment can be imposed on a defaulting municipality by 
means of discontinuing access to the consortium’s health services, to the population of the 
defaulting municipality. This is the case for the Penápolis Consortium, for example (Ribeiro & 
Costa, 1999). This corresponds to setting d=0 in the utility of the defaulting mayor in the right 
corner of Figure 3, i.e., the utility of a defaulting mayor j=2 is: 
U22(L22+0.[kSa+ (l/2)Sq], P22, a2)= U22(L22, P22, a2) 
We look for the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game. Therefore we solve 
the game by backward induction. Let us first determines the incentives for municipality 2 to 18 
 
remain in the consortium by solving the game in figure 3, when the consortium is formed (F) in 
the first period.  
  In the second period mayor 1 chooses L12=B-Sq, regardless of the choice of mayor 2 
(nodes t35 and t36). The corresponding utilities for mayor 1 are: U12(C)=U12(L12+kSa+lSq) = 
B+kSa+(l-1)Sq, when 2 decides to remain in the consortium and, U12(S)=U12(L12+kSa+(l/2)Sq) = 
B+kSa+((l/2)-1)Sq, when 2 decides to abandon it. 
In node t33, where municipality 2 decides to remain in the consortium, the maximization 
problem of the mayor 2 is, for a=f, d, 
( )




P lS kS L q a
P L Max  
s.t.     B P S L q £ + + 22 22  
Since utility is strictly increasing in  L22 and  P22, the budget constraint is binding. 
Therefore, from the first order condition, we find, for a = f, d, 
L22 = aB – (1 – a) k Sa – [a + (1 – a) l] Sq  (1) 
It is noteworthy that the above equation will indeed correspond to the solution of the 
problem of mayor 2 only if the technological gains k and l and the preferences of voters (a) 
satisfy the condition:   









a 1 1 1   (HIH) 
That condition, which is called here “Health Investment Desirability Hypothesis”, can be 
interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, the entry-fee Sa and the maintenance-quota Sq cannot 19 
 
be too high compared to the total municipal budget.
3 This section assumes that (HIH) condition 
holds. Section V presents a discussion of the results of the game when that condition is not 
satisfied. 
Substituting equation (1) into the utility function of mayor 2 yields: 
U22(C, a) = a
a (1 – a) 
(1 – a) [B + kSa + (l – 1)Sq]     (2) 
At node t 34, in which municipality 2 decides to abandon the consortium ( S), the 
maximization problem is, for a=f, d, 
( )






s.t.     B P L £ + 22 22  
The solution of the problem is L22=aB and the corresponding indirect utility function of 
the mayor is: 
U22(S,a)= (L22)
a(B –L22) 
(1 – a) =  a
a (1 – a) 
(1 – a) B  (3) 
Comparing the utility of mayors when the municipality remains in the consortium (2) 
with the utility resulting from its withdrawal from the consortium (3), one concludes that the 
potential for punishment is sufficient to assure the maintenance of the consortium once it has 
been formed, for: k, l > 1 ￿ B+kSa+(l-1)Sq > B . Therefore, regardless of the state of nature, 
municipality 2 will choose to remain (C) in node t32. 
The solution of the game in  figure 2 is immediate. In this case, the consortium is not 
formed (NF) in the first period. Municipality 1 will choose L12=B and its resulting utility will be 
                                                                  
3 This seems to meet the data; for example, the twenty-six municipalities of the State of Minas Gerais that form the 
Consortium “Alto do São Francisco” apply 2% of the Municipality Participation Fund (FPM) to the maintenance 20 
 
U12(NF)=B. On the other hand, in the state of nature  a,  municipality 2 will obtain utility 
U22(NF,a) =a
a (1 – a) 
(1 – a) B, a=f, d. 
Next we determine the incentives to form a consortium (F) by solving the game in Figure 
1. If the consortium is formed, utilities of municipalities 1 and 2 in the first period will be, 
respectively: 
U11(F)=B-Sa   and   U21(F)=f 
f(1- f )
(1-f )(B-Sa) 
When municipality 2 decides not to accept joining a partnership, or municipality 1 
decides not to make the proposal, the utilities of municipalities 1 and 2 in the first period are, 
respectively: 
U11(NF)=B   and   U21(NF)=f 
f(1- f)
(1-f)B 
Backward induction implies that, in the case where the consortium is formed, 
municipality 2 will remain in the partnership in the second period.  
The payoffs resulting from  utility  maximization of mayor 1 in the first and second 
periods, when the IHC is formed is: 
 
U1(F)=U11(F)+U12(C)=B-Sa + B+kSa+(l-1)Sq=2B+(k-1)Sa+(l-1)Sq  (4) 
When the consortium is not formed, the resulting utility of mayor 1 in the two periods is: 
U1(NF)=U11(NF)+U12(NF)=B+B=2B  (5) 
  Comparing utilities (4) and (5), one concludes that the sequentially rational strategy of 
mayor 1 is to propose the association. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
of the consortium’s administrative structure (Paulics, 2000).  On the other hand, the importance voters assign to 
health care actions compared to that attached to other actions cannot be too small. 21 
 
Turning now to municipality 2 in the first period, if the mayor receives an offer to form 
the consortium and refuses it, her expected utility in the second period will be QB, where Q = r f 
f(1 – f) (1 –  f) + (1 - r) dd(1 – d) (1 – d). Note that this mayor calculates his expected utility because 
when deciding whether or not to accept the offer she does not know voter’s realized preferences 
in t=2, that is, she is unaware of the state of nature (a2) in the second period. 
Therefore, when she decides to join the partnership but to later abandon it, her expected 
utility in the two periods will be: 
U2(NF)= f f(1 – f) (1 –  f)B + QB=[(1+r) f f(1 – f) (1 –  f)+ (1 - r) dd(1 – d) (1 – d)]B  (6) 
  On the other hand, if she accepts the proposal, her expected utility in the second period 
will be Q[B+(l-1)Sq+kSa]. Therefore, if she accepts the proposal, her expected utility on both 
periods will be: 
U2(F)= f 
f(1 – f) 
(1 –  f)(B-Sa) + Q(B+(l-1)Sq+kSa)  (7) 
Comparing equations (6) and (7), one concludes that mayor 2 will accept the proposal if 
and only if: 
Q(l-1)Sq + [k(1-r) d
d(1 – d) 
(1 – d) + (kr-1) f 
f(1 – f) 
(1 –  f)]Sa‡0  (8) 
 
Condition (8) will hold if at least one of the following conditions is satisfied: 
(i)  The technological gain from the initial investment, k, is sufficiently high. 
(ii)  The probability of a favorable state of nature, r, is sufficiently high. 
(iii)  The technological gain (l) from the maintenance quota is sufficiently high. 
(iv)  The maintenance quota Sq is sufficiently high compared to the initial investment Sa. 22 
 
Condition (i) and (ii) ensure that kr-1>0 and, as a result, all the terms in the left-hand 
side of (8) are positive. Conditions (iii) and (iv) ensure that even if this does not occur, the first 
term on the left-hand side of (8), which is positive, will dominate the second term. In this article 
we assume that some of the above conditions will hold and, therefore, there will be a unique 
solution by backward induction to the game: the IHC is formed and maintained. 
  Proposition 1 summarizes the main result in the punishment model. 
 
Proposition 1. Consider the consortium formation game in which it is possible to block access to 
the consortium health services to inhabitants of a defaulting municipality. Suppose, moreover, 
that the parameters of the game are such that the conditions below are satisfied. 

















Q(l-1)Sq + [k(1-r) d
d(1 – d) 
(1 – d) + (kr-1) f 
f(1 – f) 
(1 –  f)]Sa‡0  (8) 
  Then, there exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome in which 
municipality 1 proposes to form a consortium to municipality 2, municipality  2 accepts 1’s 
proposal in the first period and does not default on its quota payments in the second period. 
  Therefore, the IHC if formed and is sustainable. 
 
IV. Model 2: The no-punishment case 
This model assumes that it is not possible to punish the municipality that withdraws from 
the consortium, in light of the Brazilian Constitutional prohibition on any form of discrimination 
against citizens in the provision of health care services financed by the SUS. According to that 
principle, no consortium facility can deny health treatment to a citizen in need of medical 23 
 
assistance, even if the municipality in which that citizen resides does not contribute financially to 
the institution’s maintenance. Therefore, model 2 corresponds to setting d=1 in the utility of the 
defaulting mayor in the right corner of Figure 3, i.e., the utility of a defaulting mayor j=2 is: 
U22(L22+1.[kSa+ (l/2)Sq], P22, a2)= U22(L22+1.[kSa+ (l/2)Sq], P22, a2) 
The other figures remain unchanged. As in the preceding model, we look for the subgame 
perfect equilibria of the game. Therefore, we solve the game by backward induction. Note that 
there is no change in the resolution of the subgame presented in Figure 2.  
Consider now the game in Figure 3. If mayor 2 defaults, she will not make the payment 
of the maintenance fee (Sq). However, the population of that municipality will still have access to 
the consortium facilities. Therefore, the politician will be able to allocate a larger share of the 
municipal budget to other activities.  
The difference between this model and the model with punishment centers on the fact that 
the utility function of the defaulting loses only a portion of the return lSq. When municipality 2 
defaults on the maintenance-fee it is still able to benefit from the expenditures made by the other 
municipality because of the absence of punishment.  
Let us now analyze 2’s decision regarding permanence or not in the consortium. When 
municipality 2 decides to remain, the maximization problem is identical to that in model 1, so 
that the utility function of the politician is:  
U22 (C, a) = a
a (1 – a)
(1 – 
a) [B + k Sa  + (l – 1) Sq]  (9) 
On the other hand, if 2 defaults, the utility function of the politician is different than the 








l Sq, which appears in the utility function of the mayor of municipality 2, refers 
to the expenditures municipality 1 commits to the maintenance of the consortium. Since the 
utility is strictly increasing in L22 and P22, the first order condition yields, 
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The model considers that the technological gain produced by the investment made in the 
consortium’s maintenance falls within the range 1<l<2 so that the marginal benefit l has an upper 
bound of 2. Comparing the utilities of municipality 2 when it remains in the consortium (10) and 
when it withdraws from the partnership (11), we can conclude that the municipality will default. 
  Consider now the incentives for consortium  creation. According to Figure 1, if 
municipality 2 rejects the offer to enter into partnership with municipality 1 (NF), its expected 
utility function in the second is QB where, as before, Q = r f f(1 – f) (1 –  f) + (1 - r) dd(1 – d) (1 – 
d). Similarly, the expected utility in the two periods is: 
U2(NF)= f 
f(1 – f) 
(1 –  f)B + QB=[(1+r) f 
f(1 – f) 
(1 –  f)+ (1 - r) d
d(1 – d) 
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When municipality 2 decides to participate in the partnership, but defaults in the second 
period, its expected utility function is Q(B+kSa+(l/2)Sq) and its expected utility function in both 
periods is: 
U2(S)= f 
f(1 – f) 
(1 –  f)(B-Sa) + Q(B+kS a+(l/2)Sq)  (13) 
Comparing equations (12) and (13), one concludes that mayor 2 will accept the proposal 
of mayor 1 if and only if: 
Q(l/2)Sq + [k(1-r) d
d(1 – d) 
(1 – d) + (kr-1) f 
f(1 – f) 
(1 –  f)]Sa‡0  (14) 
  The above equation is similar to condition (8) of the preceding model and is assumed to 
be satisfied by the same reasons discussed earlier. Therefore, it is sequentially rational for 
municipality 2 to accept the offer of municipality 1, form the consortium in the first period, and 
default in the second period. 
We proceed now to municipality 1’s decision with respect to proposing association (node 
t11). If the mayor does not make the proposal for the formation of the consortium, her utility, 
considering both periods, is: 
U1(NF) = B+B=2B 
On the other hand, by backward induction, municipality 1 recognizes that if she makes 
the proposal (F), mayor 2 will accept it and will default in the second period. Therefore, the 
utility of mayor 1 when she makes the proposal to municipality 2 is: 
U1(F) = B-Sa + B+kSa-Sq+(l/2)Sq=2B+(k-1)Sa-(1-(l/2))Sq 
Hence, municipality 1 will propose consortium creation if: 
( ) 0
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If condition (15) is satisfied, municipality 1 will make the proposal, municipality 2 will 
accept it and will default in the second period. There will be formation but not sustainability of 
the institution. On the other hand, if (15) is not satisfied, the IHC will not be created. 
  Proposition 2 summarizes the main result in the non-punishment model. 
 
Proposition  2. Consider the consortium formation game in which it is not possible to block 
access to the consortium health services to inhabitants of a defaulting municipality.  
(i) Suppose, first, that the parameters of the game are such that the condition below are satisfied. 
2 1 < <l    
Q(l/2)Sq + [k(1-r) dd(1 – d) (1 – d) + (kr-1) f f(1 – f) (1 –  f)]Sa‡0  (14) 
( ) 0
2










   
Then, there exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome in which 
municipality  1 proposes to form a consortium to municipality 2, municipality  2 accepts 1’s 
proposal in the first period but  defaults on its quota payments in the second period. 
  Therefore, the IHC if formed but it is unsustainable. 
(ii) Suppose now that condition (15) is not satisfied. Then, there exists a unique subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium outcome in which municipality 1 will not propose to form a consortium. 
  Therefore, the IHC is not formed. 
 
Note that, when the IHC is formed, municipality 2 defaults on its obligations in period 2. 
Therefore, the resources available to the consortium are reduced, thereby leading to a decline in 27 
 
efficiency and quality of the services, which, at the same time, triggers a proportional drop in the 
technological gains accrued. This inefficiency is a common result in the partnership literature, as 
can be seem in the seminal article by Holmstrom (1982) or the more recent article by Bugarin 
(1999), Cramton, Gibbons & Klemperer (1987) or Dutta & Radner (1994).  
Therefore, the second model highlights an important fragility of the IHC. The fact that 
IHC started to be formed in Brazil only in the 80’s (Lima and Pastrana, 2000), suggests that the 
technological returns to the partnership, the parameters k and l, were not high enough before, so 
that condition (15) was not met. Only recently, with the advent of more costly high-complexity 
procedures on one hand, and the decentralization discussed earlier on the other hand, have the 
technological returns become high enough.  
Mitchell and Shortell (2000) ague that the Community Health Partnerships (CHP) in the 
USA do not show evidence of measurable results. One of the main characteristics of these 
institutions is their voluntary property. The present model may explain why such voluntary 
collaboration without a punishment rule may lead to suboptimal results.  
On the other hand, Finland’s Health Care Districts “get the majority of their money by 
selling the specialized health services to the member municipalities” (Niskanen, 2002); therefore, 
the free-rider problem is solved at it is not surprising that Finland health care output indicators 
compete well in international comparisons. 
 
V. The role of Nature 
So far, the models assumed that the entry-fee Sa and the maintenance-quota Sq do not 
represent a significant portion of the total municipal budget and that the importance voters attach 28 
 
to health actions (a) is not excessively small when compared to the significance attributed to 
other public activities. These restrictions assure that condition ( HIH) is satisfied. That 
assumption is relaxed in this section. 








( ) ( ) [ ] q a S l kS B a j a j + + ‡ 1  
(HIH¢) 
When a approaches zero, the value of j(a) becomes very large ( ( ) +¥ =
ﬁ a j
a 0 lim ), so that 
above condition will probably not be satisfied. If we consider that a represents the relative value 
voters attach to health actions and that in the unfavorable state of nature (a=d) the value of the 
parameter is small, it is reasonable to assume that condition (HIH¢) will not be satisfied in that 
state. In that case, municipality 2 will decide not to spend any resources on local health care 
actions, given that in order to assure her reelection, the mayor will choose to direct those 
resources to other types of activities. 
On the other hand, when  a  approaches one, the value of  j(a) converges to zero 
( ( ) 0 lim
1 =
ﬁ a j
a ). Therefore, in the favorable state of nature (a=f), the value of the right-hand side 
of (HIH¢) converges to Sq. In that case the previous condition will be easily satisfied, so it is 
assumed here that condition (HIH¢) still holds, so that municipality 2 will have an incentive to 
direct resources to health services. 
Note that now mayor 2 will act differently depending on the state of nature in model 1. 
When the state of nature is favorable, she will not default. However, when the state is 29 
 
unfavorable she may find it optimal to default (for certain values of the parameters), in spite of 
the treat of punishment. As the initial investment is not recovered, municipality 2 may prefer not 
to accept the proposal to form the consortium in model 1, if the probability of an unfavorable 
state of nature is two high. 
In the no-punishment model, mayor 2 will continue to have an incentive to join the 
consortium, which is therefore created, but then default. The decision of municipality 1 is 
identical to the one discussed before.  
To conclude, when nature plays a more effective role in defining the electorate’s 
preferences, consortia become even more vulnerable with respect to creation and sustainability.  
 
VI. Other extensions 
This section discusses five other alternative extensions to the basic models presented in sections 
II and III 
 
VI.1. The game in the first period: Simultaneous proposals 
The basic model assumes that municipality 1 decides first whether or not to make a proposal and, 
if so, municipality 2 decides whether or not to accept it. This asymmetry in the behavior of 
players can be easily corrected by letting both municipalities decide simultaneously whether or 
not to propose a partnership. In that case, the IHC would only be formed if both municipalities 
decide simultaneously to make the proposal or, in a more natural way, if the two municipalities 
agree simultaneously to the creation of the partnership. 30 
 
  Clearly such a modification does not change any of the results, so that the equilibria 
found earlier remain the same. However, there is, in this case, one additional equilibrium in 
which both municipalities do not make the proposal. Since the consortium is created only when 
both municipalities make the proposal, that is indeed a somewhat trivial subgame perfect 
equilibrium that results in non-formation of IHC. That equilibrium could be excluded in the case 
of Model 1 if one adds a Pareto criterion for equilibrium selection. Indeed, due to the efficiency 
gains of consortium provision of health services, the equilibrium that results in consortium 
formation and stability Pareto dominates the other equilibrium.
4 
 
VI.2. Symmetry in the possibility of default 
Suppose now both players are allowed to default. If, by defaulting, a municipality gives up all 
initial investments, the results of model 1 remain unchanged. Indeed, the threat of exclusion is a 
powerful tool for inducing municipality 1 to remain in the consortium, since it values exclusively 
health care expenditures. 
There can be different equilibria in model 2. Under this new assumption, municipality 1 
can benefit from free riding as well, if municipality 2  does not default. There are now two 
possible equilibria with consortium formation: in the first one, 2 will default and 1 will keep the 
consortium structure whereas in the second one, municipality 1 suspends payment and 2 stays. In 
any of the two equilibria, there will be formation of the consortium, but it will not be sustainable. 
In the case where the technological return does not compensate the free rider effect, the 
consortium will not be formed, similarly to the original model. 
                                                                  
4 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this equilibrium. 31 
 
 
VI.3. Symmetric utility functions  
Assume now that both mayors value health care actions as well as other actions. If one holds the 
hypothesis that municipality 1 cannot withdraw from the consortium and assumes that a 
condition to equivalent (HIH) is valid for that municipality, the same results of model 1 are 
obtained. 
  However, in model 2, the losses due to the free rider behavior increase for player 1, since 
health care actions become less important to her. Therefore, the incentives for mayor 1 not to be 
interested in the partnership increase, so that the consortium will more likely not be created.  
 
VI.4. Infinitely repeated game 
Assume now that, if the consortium is formed in period t=1, then player 2 decides in each period 
t>1 whether to remain in the institution, paying that period maintenance fee  q S or withdraw from 
the IHC. Once the decision of abandoning the consortium is made, municipality 2 will not return 
to the institution. In this case there is no modification in model 1: the threat of denying the 
population access to the consortium facilities is sufficient to sustain the partnership. In fact the 
incentive becomes even stronger when municipality 2 is aware that the gains from the 
association can be repeated infinitely. In this context, there is no need for a Folk Theorem 
argument. 
  In model 2, the free rider effect is repeated in each period so that 2 has a greater incentive 
to accept the formation of the IHC and then, to default. However, the additional gain from the 
initial investment, which was the main incentive for 1 to make the proposal is now reduced due 32 
 
to the losses that 1 will have to face in all the infinite remaining periods. In that case, 1 will not 
propose creation of the consortium. 
  The above result for model 2 will change if municipality 1 has the possibility of 
dissolving the partnership, when municipality 2 does default. If the resulting dissolution is 
irreversible, then the threat of ending the partnership is used to discipline the behavior of 2. In 
that case, a Folk Theorem result ensures the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the repeated 
game, in which municipality 1 abandons the partnership if 2 defaults (a trigger strategy). In this 
situation, the stability of the consortium is maintained. However, this equilibrium may not be 
subgame perfect. In fact, if the IHC dissolution implies in the total loss of the initial investment, 
the threat may not be credible. Therefore it becomes relevant to study the mechanisms that will 
be used in the moment the partnership breaks out, since they may play a fundamental role in the 
credibility of the trigger strategy (Cramton et al., 1987).  
 
VI.5. Discount factor 
Suppose now players discount time t=2 payoffs at discount-rate m˛(0,1]. Then, the opportunity 
cost of giving up the resources allocated to the entry-fee in the first period increases so that 
waiting for the investment to mature becomes more costly. Despite the fact that nothing changes 
in the resolution of the games presented in Figures 2 and 3, which occur in the second period, the 
probability that players will not constitute the IHC in the first period increases. 
 
VII. A Brief Discussion on Possible Solutions to the Consortium Problem 33 
 
  The analysis of different generalizations of the models studied earlier confirms the 
difficulties in  forming and sustaining i ntermunicipal health consortia as the negative results 
obtained seem  rather  robust. However, both the theoretical literature and the Brazilian 
government have been engaged in pointing out possible solutions to the consortium problem. 
  On the theoretical side, a companion paper (Teixeira, Bugarin and Dourado, 2006)  
presents a contract theoretic analysis of the consortium problem.  The main conclusions of the 
paper are the following. First, the Federal government can align municipalities’ incentives by 
offering additional  monetary transfers to the municipality that does not default. Due to the 
efficiency loss in case of default, the required transfers may be much smaller than the quota Sq. 
Second, if transfers from higher levels of government are not an option, the Federal government 
can still play the role of the regulator of the federalism, as suggested in Oates (1999). The main 
mechanism here is that the municipalities sign a contract allowing the Federal government to 
deposit the quota directly into the consortium accounts in case of default. In that case, the 
Federal government will also deduce that amount from the mandatory  transfers it is 
constitutionally required to make to the defaulting partnership. Such a mechanism solves the 
commitment problem with no cost for the Federal government, so that a municipality will never 
be able to default in the second period. Finally, the second mechanism has the drawback of 
reducing the incentives for consortia formation. Indeed, since the municipality knows that it will 
not be able withdraw from the partnership in the future, its mayor may prefer not to make such 
an irreversible commitment that he will regret if the realized state of nature is unfavorable in 
period 2. In that case, the Federal government may offer additional transfer incentives when the 
consortium is formed, in order to make this step more attractive and align the municipalities’ 34 
 
incentives, by affecting the technological gains (the parameter l) from IHC formation. We refer 
to the paper for modeling details. 
  On the government’s side, the issue of consortium regulation has been widely discussed 
over the last ten years and, on April 6, 2005 Congress passed a new legislation (Law 11107) 
aimed at regulating  consortia. The new law establishes the  rules for intermunicipal consortia 
formation and management and requires specific contracts for these institutions. It allows for 
exclusion of defaulting municipalities, but it does not deal with the issue of blocking access to 
inhabitants from  these  defaulting municipalities. In that case, due to the constitutional 
requirement of non-exclusion of public health services, being excluded from the consortium may 
become in fact a reward, rather than a punishment, since the exclude municipality’s inhabitants 
will not be blocked from consortium health services and the mayor does not have to pay the 
consortium maintenance quota. Thus, the new legislation, although  it  makes it clearer that a 
defaulting municipality may be punished, does not set the proper legal framework for that 
punishment to have a real effect on the municipality’s decision about defaulting. Therefore, one 





The present article has analyzed the sustainability of intermunicipal health care consortia in the 
light of game theory. 35 
 
Although there are potential gains of scale, scope and coordination associated to such 
partnerships, the study shows that there are free rider incentives to be dealt with in order to 
ensure stability to the consortium. The free rider problem arises from the fact that one of the 
members of the partnership may benefit from the gains of joint provision of health services 
without participating in its financing. This problem is aggravated in Brazil by a Constitutional 
clause that states that health care funded by public institutions cannot segregate, so that every 
citizen should have access to any public health care establishment when needed. 
Under such conditions health care consortia are unstable and the gains from association 
may be unachievable. The result is shown to be robust to the inclusion of a variety of frictions in 
the basic model. 
Therefore, in order to cope with the instability of intermunicipal consortia, one needs to 
look for new forms of incentives that could counter the free rider effect. Those could involve 
transfers from higher-level governments to stable consortia, some type of commitment-contract 
between the partnership members or a mix of both types of incentives. Given the potential 
efficiency gains associated to the partnership, the analysis of stabilizing mechanisms is left as a 
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